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Abstract 
 
This paper will offer a five-step interpretation of the Greatest Difficulty Argument (GDA) in Plato’s 
Parmenides (133c-134c). I agree with Sandra Peterson that Plato presents two arguments in the GDA (the 
active argument up to 134b6 and the passive argument following). However I will argue that Peterson’s 
interpretation of the passive argument relies on an unintuitive premise. I will present a modified passive 
argument that is not dependent on the unintuitive premise. I will lastly present an interpretation of 
134b12 so that it contributes to both the active and passive routes. 
 
 
 
In the Parmenides Plato shows us problems with his theory of forms through a series of 
arguments that Parmenides directs against Socrates. In this paper I will focus on the 
greatest difficulty argument from 133c-134c. Parmenides introduces the argument at 
133a8-9: “Then do you see, Socrates…how great the difficulty is if one marks things 
off as forms, themselves by themselves?” 2 The argument takes us from this hypothesis 
to the absurd conclusion that “[the forms] cannot even be known [by us]” (133b4-6). 
There has been much secondary literature attempting to accurately interpret this 
argument. Sandra Peterson’s influential paper3 posits two arguments. In this paper I 
will show that one of these arguments (the passive) relies on an unintuitive premise, 
and I will offer a five-step interpretation of the entire passage that is not dependent on 
this premise. 
 
                                               
1
 This paper has already been published in Ex Nihilo, the University of Texas at Austin Undergraduate 
Philosophy Journal (Spring 2011). 
 
2 All Greek translations by Mary Louise Gill and Paul Ryan. See Plato, Complete Works, ed. John M. 
Cooper (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. , 1997), 367-368. 
  
3 Sandra Peterson, “The Greatest Difficulty for Plato's Theory of Forms: the Unknowability Argument of 
Parmenides 133c-134c,” Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 63 (1981): 1-16. Because I cite this paper 
so frequently I will cite page numbers from her article in the body of my text. 
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Step One (133c3-7) 
 
In step one Parmenides proves A, that if x is a form then x is not in us. Peterson shows, 
and Rickless agrees, that Parmenides uses two premises to prove this. 4 He first posits at 
133c4 that each form is itself for itself, and second at 133c4-6 that nothing in us is itself 
for itself. 5 This yields the conclusion A, said explicitly at 133c5, that “none of [the 
forms are] in us.”  
 
 
Step Two (133c8-d6, 133e4-134a2) 
 
Parmenides introduces in step two the principles BF and BS. At 133c8-d1 he says: “All 
the characters that are what they are in relation to each other have their being in relation 
to themselves but not in relation to things that belong to us.” Peterson interprets this 
passage as BF: “If x is what it is in relation to y, then if x is a form, y is a form” (p. 7). 
She understands this principle to mean: “the answer to the question ‘What is it?’ asked 
about a form will not mention any non-forms” (p. 3). More broadly, she argues that for 
any x and y, if x is what it is in relation to y then x will be defined only by reference to 
y (p. 5). 6 For example if a knowledge is what it is in relation to a truth, then that 
knowledge will be defined only by reference to that truth (knowledge of x). 
 
Some commentators interpret BF as arguing for a divorce thesis: either relational forms 
(those which are what they are in relation to another) have no relations to non-forms7 or 
all forms have no relations to what is in us. 8  However, as Rickless points out, it is 
unlikely that Parmenides would use the premise that forms have no relations to 
sensibles, because it is an essential part of Plato’s theory of forms that sensibles have 
their properties by partaking of forms. 9 Peterson also gives another argument against 
                                               
4
 See Peterson (ibid., 6-7); and Samuel Rickless, (1) “How Parmenides Saved the Theory of Forms,” The 
Philosophical Review 107 (Oct. 1998): 535. 
 
5
 Samuel Rickless shows evidence from the Parmenides, Phaedo, Symposium, and Timaeus to support 
the second premise in (2) Plato's Forms in Transition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 
17-20. 
 
6 Peterson’s interpretation might seem too extreme, but for this essay I will assume it. 
 
7 See Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (New York: Russell & Russell, 
1962), 283-4 n. 191; and Norio Fujisawa, “χειν, Μετέχειν, and Idioms of 'Paradeigmatism' in Plato's 
Theory of Forms,” Phronesis 19 (1974): 30-34. 
 
8 See Rudolph Weingartner, The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue: The Cratylus, the Protagoras, the 
Parmenides (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1973), 185-6. 
 
9 See Rickless (ibid. [2)], 88). ‘Divorce Thesis’ is Peterson’s terminology (ibid., 3).  
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this divorce thesis: the premise introduced at 134b12 would be immediately derivable if 
we interpret a divorce thesis (p. 11-12). Because we might want to (and I will argue that 
we should) interpret 134b12 as offering new content based on premises developed in 
the greatest difficulty argument, we should give up the divorce thesis interpretation.  
At 133d2-5 Plato says: “These things that belong to us…are in their turn what they are 
in relation to themselves, but not in relation to the forms; and all the things named in 
this way are of themselves but not of the forms.” Peterson interprets from “are…what 
they are in relation to themselves” and “are of themselves” BS: “If x is what it is in 
relation to y, then if x is in us then y is in us” (p. 7). At 133e4-134a1 Parmenides 
repeats principles BF and BS:   
 
Things in us do not have their power in relation to forms, nor do they have 
theirs in relation to us; but, I repeat, forms are what they are of themselves and 
in relation to themselves, and things that belong to us are, in the same way, what 
they are in relation to themselves.  
 
Parmenides uses the phrase “have their power,” instead of “are what they are” or “have 
being” and I agree with Peterson that Plato offers nothing new in this change of phrase 
(p. 2-3). Likewise, instead of ‘alongside us’ (133c9-d2) he uses ‘in us’ (133e5) and 
instead of “in relation to things that belong to us” (133c9-d1) he uses “in relation to us” 
(133e5), and I take both of these pairs to contain equivalent phrases. 
 
 
Step Three (133d7-133e4, 134a3-b2) 
 
In step three, Parmenides implies both CM and CK. He implies CM: if x is master of y 
then x is what it is in relation to y. To do so he argues [CM combined with BF] and [CM 
combined with BS]. Then he implies CK: If x is knowledge of y then x is what it is in 
relation to y. To do so he argues [CK combined with BF] and [CK combined with BS]. 
Peterson only writes that CK is “suggested by 134a-b,” (p. 6) and therefore she does not 
fully explain how Plato implies CK. The preceding implication of CM before CK is 
important because the symmetry between the master-slave example and the knowledge 
example is a necessary step for Plato to imply CK. 10 Parmenides says in 133e2-e4: 
 
                                               
10 Unlike Peterson, Rickless also seems to argue for the necessity of the symmetry: “knowledge is the sort 
of thing that (like masters or slaves) has only relative being” (ibid. [2], 90). James Forrester assumes the 
necessity in “Arguments an Able Man Could Refute: Parmenides 133b-134e,” Phronesis 19 (1974): 234-
236; and so does Frank Lewis who cites as evidence 134a3-4 and a6-7 in “Parmenides on Separation and 
the Knowability of the Forms: Plato Parmenides 133a ff.,” Philosophical Studies 35 (Feb. 1979): 114. 
Forrester and Lewis both argue against the soundness of the symmetry in order to present the overall 
argument as unsuccessful. 
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 …being a human being, [somebody] is a master or slave of a human being. 
Mastery itself, on the other hand, is what it is of slavery itself; and in the same 
way, slavery itself is slavery of mastery itself. 
 
At 133e3-4 he literally asserts [CM combined with BF]: if x is master of y and x is a 
form, then y is a form. Then at 133e2-3 he argues [CM combined with BS]: if x is 
master of y and x is alongside us (a sensible), y is alongside us (a sensible). Therefore 
he implies CM: if x is master of y then x is what it is in relation to y.  
 
Parmenides next says at 134a3-7: 
 
So too…knowledge itself, what knowledge is, would be knowledge of that truth 
itself, which is what truth is…Furthermore, each particular knowledge, what it 
is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing is. 
 
He asserts two instances (at 134a3-4 concerning the form of knowledge itself and at 
134a6-7 concerning each particular form of knowledge) of [CK combined with BF]: if x 
is knowledge of y and x is a form, then y is a form. Then at 134a9-10 he says:  
 
….But wouldn’t knowledge that belongs to us be of the truth that belongs to our 
world? And wouldn’t it follow that each particular knowledge that belongs to us 
is in turn knowledge of some particular thing in our world? 
 
Here he presents a parallel set of two instances (concerning the form of knowledge 
itself and each form of each particular knowledge) of [CK combined with BS]: if x is 
knowledge of y and x is alongside us (a sensible), y is alongside us (a sensible). He 
implies CK: If x is knowledge of y then x is what it is in relation to y. 
 
 
Step Four (134b3-10)  
 
Parmenides reaches the conclusion D in step four that there is no knowledge x of Form 
y in us. Parmenides first reminds us at 134b3-4 of A: “As you agree, we neither have 
the forms themselves nor can they belong to us.” As Peterson argues, without using 
134b6-7 or 134b9, Parmenides can reach his desired conclusion D (p. 8). This is what 
Peterson calls the active argument. Parmenides only needs to combine A with [CK* 
combined with BS*] (if x is knowledge of Form y and x is in us, then Form y is in us— 
note the specification of y as a form). This yields D: if x is knowledge of Form y, x is 
not in us. 
 
At 134b6-7, Parmenides says: “And surely the kinds themselves, what each of them is, 
are known by the form of knowledge itself?” Many commentators interpret 134b6-7 as 
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problematic self-predication where the form of knowledge itself ‘knows.’11 However, 
given that self-predication does no work in the argument that I have presented, I agree 
with Peterson that Plato does not argue for self-predication.12  
 
Peterson argues instead that 134b6-7 makes a claim about “the appropriate kind of 
knowledge itself” (p. 5-6). She says if 134b6-7 was actually about “knowledge itself” it 
should be at least compatible with 134a3-4 because that passage also describes 
“knowledge itself.” 134a3-4 says “knowledge itself” is of “truth-itself.” 134b6-7 says 
(assuming the equivalence of ‘x is knowledge of y’ and ‘y is known by x’) that 
“‘knowledge itself’ is of ‘particular [forms].’” It doesn’t make sense for Plato to say 
knowledge itself is of two different things, so it seems we should accept 134a3-4 as 
describing ‘knowledge-itself,’ and 134b6-7 as describing particular forms of 
knowledge. I agree with Peterson on this interpretation that “knowledge-itself” refers to 
the appropriate kind of knowledge. 
 
Peterson thinks that 134b6-7 begins the passive argument, and thus she interprets it as 
2P: if x is knowledge of y and y is a form, then x is a form (p. 8). To derive 2P, 
Peterson says Plato combines BF (If y is what it is in relation to x, then if y is a form 
then x is a form) and an unstated premise (IIIP in Peterson’s notation), which is 
equivalent to: If x is knowledge of y then y is what it is in relation to x (p. 7). Peterson 
finally combines A with 2P to yield 3P: if x is knowledge of y and y is a form, then x is 
not in us (p. 7). 3P is equivalent to D. Peterson interprets 134b9 as support for 3P 
because Parmenides says: “the very thing we don’t have,” (‘thing’ refers to the x form 
of knowledge) (p. 7, 11). 
 
However, I argue, as Rickless agrees, 13 that IIIP is too weak of a premise to attribute 
the passive argument to Plato. IIIP would “get such unwelcome results as: ‘Justice 
itself is what it is pros [relative to] my knowledge of justice itself.’”14 As Peterson 
argues, if something is what it is in relation to y, then it can only be defined by 
reference to y. Unlike knowledge, which seems like it can only be defined in reference 
                                               
11 See F.M. Cornford, Plato and Parmenides (New York: Humanities Press , 1951), 98; Richard 
Robinson, Plato's Earlier Dialectic, Second Edition (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1953), 235-6; 
Weingartner (ibid., 186); and Forrester (ibid., 234). 
 
12 Peterson (ibid., 4). Lewis also offers another argument against a “vicious” self-predication reading; he 
cites passages from the Charmides that suggest that Plato is not sensitive to a difference between a 
“syntactical” SP present in “is knowledge of” (does not attribute knowing to the form itself) and a 
“vicious” SP in “knows,” (does attribute ‘knowing’ to the form itself) and thus the “vicious” self-
predication reading is unjustified (ibid., 115-116). 
 
13
 Rickless (ibid. [1], 535-536).  
 
14 Peterson admits this result from IIIP, but she still attributes the passive argument and IIIP to Plato 
(ibid., 9). 
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to what it is of, it seems plainly false that to give a definition of what Justice is, 
someone would only be able to refer to my knowledge of Justice. Therefore Plato 
would not have used the passive argument, which requires IIIP.  
 
Thus I think we are left with two options. One: salvage Peterson’s passive argument in 
a way that would not require IIIP or two: reject Peterson’s passive argument and 
interpret 134b6-7 and 134b9 as separate from the passive argument. The problem with 
option two is that the only way to interpret 134b6-7 and 134b9 as separate from the 
passive argument renders them superfluous.  
 
The most natural way to interpret 134b6-7 as separate from the passive argument is to 
interpret it as repeating the content of 134a6-7 (besides switching ‘knowledge of’ to ‘is 
known by’ and switching the subject and predicate): “Furthermore, each particular 
knowledge, what it is, would be knowledge of some particular thing, of what that thing 
is.”15 Recall that we interpreted 134a6-7 as [CK combined with BF]: if x is knowledge 
of y and x is a form, then y is a form. We would interpret 134b9 as combining A with 
[CK combined with BF] to yield: if x is knowledge of y and x is a form, then y is a form 
and x is not in us. However, this does not get Plato any closer to D, even though it is 
not necessarily repetitive. 16 
 
It does not seem likely to me that Plato would waste time writing unnecessary words, 
and therefore I will offer a modified Peterson passive argument that is not dependent on 
IIIP. I argue that we need to change 2P to 2P†: If x is knowledge of y then x is a form 
iff y is a form. This is derived from a new premise, BF†, combined with CK. The 
premise BF† is: if x is what is in relation to y then x is a form iff y is a form. The 
premise BF† would have serious implications for our interpretations of 133c8-d5, 
133e2-134a1, and 134a3-10. 
 
For step two it seems reasonable to change our interpretation from BF to BF† because 
“are what they are in relation to each other” (133c8), “have their being in relation to 
themselves” (133c9), and “are what they are of themselves” (133e6) seem to allow the 
additional restriction added to the consequent of BF: “AND if y is a form, then x is a 
form.” Likewise Plato uses the same phrases to argue for the proposition that we 
interpreted as BS, and thus it seems that we can, and should to maintain symmetry, 
interpret BS as BS†, if x is what is in relation to y then x is in us iff y is in us. 
 
                                               
15 Lewis assumes 134b6-7 is repeating 134a3-4 and by implication, 134a6-7; however, unlike me he 
reads 134b6-7 as about “knowledge itself” (without a “vicious” self-predication) (ibid., 116). 
 
16 Because he denies the passive argument, but agrees with the rest of Peterson’s argument, this is how I 
understand Rickless to interpret 134b6-7 and 134b9 (ibid. [2], 90). Rickless thinks that BF (what he calls 
premise A) is not used in the ‘greatest difficulty’ argument to get to the conclusion, but is only used in 
the ‘more terrible’ argument (ibid. [2], 85-93).  
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It also seems reasonable to change our interpretations of BS and BF within the master-
slave example of step three to BS† and BF†. At 133e2-3 Parmenides says “a master or 
slave of,” thereby legitimizing the addition to the consequent of BS: “AND if y is in us, 
then x is in us.” For 133e3-4, Parmenides likewise describes mastery as “of slavery 
itself,” and slavery as “of mastery itself,” thus making BF† reasonable. Unfortunately, 
for the knowledge example at 134a3-10, BS† and BF† are not explicitly stated. In both 
the knowledge itself and particular knowledge instances, Parmenides only describes 
knowledge as of an object of knowledge. However, given the weakness of IIIP, I assert 
that Plato does indeed imply BS† and BF†. 
 
To get from 2P† to D, consider the following. 2P† is equivalent to: if x is knowledge of 
y then [(if x is a form then y is a form) and (if y is a form then x is a form)]. Combining 
2P† with A (if x is a form then x is not in us), we can assert: if x is knowledge of y then 
[(if x is a form then y is a form and x is not in us) and (if y is a form then x is not in 
us)]. We can cite 134b9 “the very thing we don’t have,” as evidence of Plato supporting 
the combination of A with 2P†. Lastly, assuming only that y is a form, we have the 
conclusion D: if x is knowledge of Form y then x is not in us. Overall I support two 
routes to D: the active route from A with [CK* combined with BS*] and the passive 
route from A with 2P†. 
 
 
Step Five (134b11-c3) 
 
In the last step Parmenides goes from D to his overall conclusion that we do not know 
the forms. For Peterson’s active argument (which uses D from the active route), 
Peterson reaches her overall conclusion with three premises.  
 
Her first premise E is: we are called by a name of the form Φ iff there is a likeness of 
the form Φ in us (p. 7).  She gets this from 133d1-2: “Whether one posits the latter as 
likenesses or in some other way, it is by partaking of them that we come to be called by 
their various names. Peterson’s translates the clause: “things alongside us…having 
which,” which she says: “tells us that some of the things alongside us are the same as 
what is had by us, i.e., in us” (p. 3). Thus she translates the µετέχειν (here translated as 
‘partaking of’) of this sentence as “having,” and the relative plural pronoun ν (here 
translated as ‘them’) as referring to the likenesses. 
 
Her next premise F (unstated in Parmenides 133c-134c) is: if anything x is a likeness of 
a form Φ, x is a Φ (p. 7) We can look at Phaedo 102c2,4,7, where having a likeness of a 
form gives a human the form’s quality. Lastly, she uses premise G (also unstated in 
Parmenides 133c-134c): ‘knows Form y’ and its active inflections are names of the 
Form of knowledge in us of Form y (p. 7). Altogether, because there is nothing that is a 
knowledge in us of Form y, (1) by F, there is nothing x that it is a likeness of the Form 
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of knowledge in us of Form y. (2) By E we are not called by a name of the Form of 
knowledge in us of Form y, and (3) by G we are not called by ‘knows Form y.’ All the 
premises for this conclusion have appeared before 134b2 (unless we count 134b3-4 
where Parmenides reminds us of A).  
 
For her passive argument, Peterson uses only the unstated premise H (which is 
essentially a simplified version of E, F, and G):  if we know anything y, then there is 
some knowledge x in us such that x is knowledge of y (p. 7).17 H combined with D 
yields immediately the conclusion that we do not know any forms. Therefore her 
passive conclusion matches Plato’s words at 134b11: “So none of the forms is known 
by us.” At 134b12 Parmenides says, “because we don’t partake of knowledge itself.” In 
her passive argument Peterson interprets “partake of” as “have,” an interpretation 
supported by Cornford and Fujisawa.18 When she uses H, Peterson interprets 134b12 is 
repeating the content of 134b9 (p. 8, 11).19 
 
However again I do not think that Plato would repeat unnecessary words, so I will offer 
an interpretation of 134b12 in which µετέχειν means “partake of,” not “have,” and it 
explains Parmenides’s final steps. Peterson admits the possibility of 134b12 meaning 
“partake of,” however she does not specify exactly how 134b12 would support the 
premises that take Plato from D to his conclusion (p. 11). Peterson does think that 
“knowledge itself” in 134b12 means the appropriate kind of knowledge x of Form y, to 
maintain symmetry with her interpretation of 134b6-7 and 134b9, and I agree with this 
(p. 11).  
 
At 134b12 I think Plato is using the verb µετέχειν (translated here “partake of”) as he 
uses it traditionally at Parmenides 130b2-4 and in the Phaedo (102c2,4,7, 103b6) to 
mean “partake of,” which is the relation of the sensibles to the form.20 To understand 
why, we must turn back to 133d1-2, where Peterson translated the µετέχειν as “having,” 
and the relative plural pronoun ν as referring to the likenesses. Fujisawa agrees with 
                                               
17 Unlike Peterson, Rickless uses H to get from D (from the active route) to the conclusion (ibid. [1], 535-
536). 
 
18 Cornford interprets it as “have” because of reasons related to his assumption that 134b6-7 shows 
“vicious” self-predication (ibid., 99). Fujisawa interprets it as “have” because he thinks all sensibles 
partake of forms, and thus to say they do not partake of a form is false (ibid., 33). However, as I will 
show it seems entirely acceptable within the passive argument to say that we do not partake of the 
appropriate form of knowledge of Form y. 
 
19 Lewis also thinks that 134b12 is repeating 134b9, which, unlike Peterson’s interpretation, is itself 
instantiating the point made at 134b3-4 (that we do not have the forms) to: “the form of knowledge, too 
is not present in us” (ibid., 116, 126 n. 20). It seems to me that Lewis derives his overall conclusion only 
from 134a3-4 and 134b9, and thus his argument resembles something like Peterson’s passive argument.  
 
20 Fujisawa points out this traditional use of µετέχειν (ibid., 31, 32, n. 4) 
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Peterson on this translation because he thinks Plato incorrectly uses µετέχειν instead of 
χειν in both the ‘greatest difficulty’ argument and the ‘more terrible’ argument to 
serve his introduction of an alternative use of πρός at 133c8ff (p. 34). It seems 
reasonable to think that if Plato introduced a new sense of the word πρός, he would rely 
on traditional uses of his other words to not further confuse his readers. It also seems 
acceptable to me to take ν as referring to the forms.21 In addition, if we translate 
µετέχειν in 133d1-2 as “partaking of,” then we can read Plato’s use of µετέχειν in 
134b12 as referring back to a modified E* premise introduced at 133d1-2.  
 
Therefore we can interpret 133d1-2 as E*: we are called by a name of the Form Φ iff 
we partake of the Form Φ. We would add an unstated premise I: we partake of the 
Form Φ iff there is a likeness of the form Φ in us. The idea that partaking of the form Φ 
is equivalent to having the likeness of the form Φ is suggested for example in the 
Phaedo 100d-102c and Peterson herself agrees (p. 10). Now consider the argument: 
because there is nothing that is a knowledge in us of Form y, (1) by F, there is nothing 
x that is a likeness of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y; (2) By I we do not 
partake of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y; (3) By E* we are not called by a 
name of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y; and (4) by G we are not called by 
‘knows Form y.’ Now we can interpret 134b12 as asserting (2).22 
 
Overall I have offered a five-step interpretation of the ‘greatest difficulty’ argument in 
Parmenides 133c-134c. I argued specifically to change Peterson’s passive argument in 
order to avoid reliance on the weak premise IIIP and to change the premises that 
Parmenides uses to go from D to the conclusion in order to interpret 134b12 as 
contributing to the argument. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
21 Cited by Fujisawa (ibid., 32, n. 8), Cherniss (ibid., n. 101, 102) and two other commentators support 
this reading. 
 
22
 We could use this apparatus with D from the active and passive routes. Peterson herself might have 
had a similar “apparatus” in mind, as the one premise that she offers to connect D to the conclusion while 
interpreting µετέχειν in 134b12 as “partaking of” is: “If a form x is some knowledge of something y, then 
any likeness z of x is a knowledge of y” (ibid., 11).  
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Appendix 
 
I have organized this according to the five steps of the paper. Notice that all premises of 
active argument occur before 134b3-4 but some premises of passive argument occur 
after 134b3-4. 
 
STEP ONE: 
A  If x is a form then x is not in us. 133c3-7 
 
STEP TWO: 
BF  If x is what it is in relation to y, then if x is a form, y is a form. 133c8-d1, 133e4-
134a1  
BS  If x is what it is in relation to y, then if x is in us then y is in us. 133d2-5, 133e4-
134a1  
 
STEP THREE: 
CM  If x is master of y then x is what it is in relation to y. 133e2-e4 
CK  If x is knowledge of y then x is what it is in relation to y. 134a3-7, 134a9-10  
 
STEP FOUR: 
Peterson’s Active Argument Part I. 
CK*  If x is knowledge of Form y then x is what it is in relation to Form y. (instantiated 
CK of step three)  
BS*  If x is what it is in relation to Form y, then if x is in us then Form y is in us. 
(instantiated BS of step two) 
D: If x is knowledge of Form y, x is not in us.  (A 134b3-4 + [CK* + BS*] 134a9-10) 
 
Peterson’s Passive Argument Part I. 
IIIP If x is knowledge of y then y is what it is in relation to x. (unstated) 
2P  If x is knowledge of y and y is a form, then x is a form. (BF + IIIP) 134b6-7  
3P (Equivalent to D): if x is knowledge of y and y is a form, then x is not in us. (A + 
2P) 134b9  
 
Revised Passive Argument Part I (does not rely on unintuitive IIIP). 
BF†  If x what it is in relation to y then x is a form iff y is a form. 133c8-9, 133e6, 
133e3-4  
BS†  If x is what is in relation to y then x is in us iff y is in us.  133c8-9, 133e6, 133e2-3  
2P†  If x is knowledge of y then x is a form iff y is a form. (BF† + CK) 134b6-7  
D If x is knowledge of Form y then x is not in us. (A + 2P†) 134b9  
 
STEP FIVE: 
Peterson’s Active Argument Part II. 
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D There is nothing that is a knowledge in us of Form y. (conclusion of Active 
Argument Part I)  
F  If anything x is a likeness of a form Φ, x is a Φ (unstated, but I suggest Phaedo 
102c2,4,7)  
E We are called by a name of the form Φ iff there is a likeness of the form Φ in us. 
133d1-2 
G  ‘Knows Form y’ is a name of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y (unstated). 
There is nothing x that it is a likeness of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y. (D + 
F)  
We are not called by a name of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y. [(D + F) + E]  
We are not called by ‘knows Form y.’  ([(D + F) + E] + G)  
 
Peterson’s Passive Argument Part II. 
H:  If we know anything y, then there is some knowledge x in us of y (unstated) 
D: There is no knowledge x in us of Form y. (conclusion of Passive Argument Part I) 
We do not know any forms. (H + D) 134b11 
 
Revised Passive Argument Part II (makes use of 134b12*). 
D There is nothing that is a knowledge in us of Form y. (conclusion of Passive 
Argument Part I)  
F  If anything x is a likeness of a form Φ, x is a Φ (unstated, but I suggest Phaedo 
102c2,4,7)  
I: We partake of the Form Φ iff there is a likeness of the form Φ in us. (Phaedo 100d-
102c) 
E*: We are called by a name of the Form Φ iff we partake of the Form Φ. 133d1-2  
G  ‘Knows Form y’ is a name of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y (unstated). 
There is nothing x that it is a likeness of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y. (D + 
F)  
We do not partake of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y. [(D + F)  + I] *134b12 
We are not called by a name of the Form of knowledge in us of Form y [(D + F)  + I] + 
E*] 
We are not called by ‘knows Form y.’  ([[(D + F)  + I] + E*]+ G)  
 
